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Original focus on threat, time to shift to harm? 
• Since 1990s law enforcement agencies have largely focused 
on threats of offenders, developing OCTAs 
– Threat: likelihood of the adverse event, function of capability (= 
resources × knowledge) and intent (= desire × confidence) (Bond, 2004)  
• But idea of risk assessment contains both threat and harm: 
– Consists of a “direct estimation of the likelihood of the adverse event 
(the threat), combined with a similar estimation of the consequences of 
the event (the harm)” (Bond, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
• In study intended to help Belgian Federal Police set up 
strategic priorities in the control of OC, we decided to focus 
on harm (de facto risk) rather than threat 
Harm Threat 
Risk 
The centrality of harm to crime 
• Harm serves as “fulcrum between criminal conduct 
and the punitive sanction” (Hall, 1960: 213) 
– Link to harm is obscured in penal codes 
• At least implicitly, most penal codes and sentencing 
policies reflect offence seriousness (harm + 
offender’s culpability)  
– E.g., maximum sentences  
• Some European countries and U.S. states require the 
severity of the penalty to be proportionate to the 
seriousness of the offence  
– E.g., UK’s Criminal Justice Act of 2003 
Harm is increasingly relevant  
in crime control policy 
• Harm reduction is considered important goal in many 
policy communities 
– E.g., drug policy and counterterrorism but also poverty 
alleviation, anti-discrimination, pollution and disease control 
• Harm is increasingly proposed as benchmark to set up 
crime control priorities 
– E.g., UK’s 2008 Organized Crime Strategy: 
• The overarching aim of the [OC Control] Strategy is to achieve a 
tangible and lasting reduction in the harms caused to the UK by OC” 
(SOCA, 2008) 
– E.g., shift from “organized crime” to “serious crime” in EU 
• Many police agencies already use self-made tools to 
assess harms (see Tusikov 2012)  
• Great Recession has made us even more aware of need 
to allocated scarce resources efficiently 
Harm: Neglected concept in criminology 
• Crime usually regarded as a harm in itself 
– 2012 search in CJ Abstracts found only 11 hits with “harm” and 
“crime” as keywords 
• Critical criminologists call for shift from crime to harm 
but provide little specification 
• Despite growing interest in victims, no systematic 
attempt to distinguish consequences of different criminal 
activities 
• Research on related concepts: 
– Perceived seriousness of crime  
– Costs of crime  
– Impact of criminal victimization 
– Drug related harms 
Neglect is at least partially due to  
daunting conceptual and technical challenges 
• Five sets of challenges: 
– Morality, cultural and socio-economic variability and 
subjectivity 
– Infinitude, standardization, causality 
– Gross v. net harms 
– Quantification 
– Incommensurability 
• Greenfield and Paoli (2013) have developed  a harm 
assessment framework to address some of these 
challenges and tested it on organized crime activities 
in Belgium and the Netherlands 
 
 
Outline 
The harm assessment framework 
• Application of harm framework to cannabis 
production in Belgium  
• Conclusions 
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Business model fuels assessment process 
• Depicts modus operandi of criminal activity 
– characterizes key operational phases of activity and, 
– for complex crimes, describes roles and modes of 
“accompanying” and “enabled” activities 
• Provides building blocks of information or 
“evidentiary base” for identifying possible harms, 
evaluating their severity and incidence, prioritizing 
them, and establishing their causality 
Who, what, where, 
how, why, when 
Quantitative and 
qualitative data set 
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Taxonomy delineates type & bearers 
Source: authors drawing from von Hirsch and Jareborg (1991) and others. 
Notes: X = applicable; n/a = not applicable; 
* Functional integrity = Physical and psychological integrity; 
** Functional integrity = Operational integrity; 
*** Functional integrity = Physical, operational, and aesthetic integrity 
BEARER OF HARM 
Individuals 
Private-
Sector 
Entities 
Government 
Entities Environment 
TYPE OF HARM 
Functional integrity X* X** X** X*** 
Material interest X X X n/a 
Reputation X X X n/a 
Privacy X X X n/a 
HARMS TO INDIVIDUALS, specifically to their: 
Functional 
integrity  
Damages to physical and psychological health and safety, ranging from 
death to minor injury, the latter resulting in only momentary pain or 
discomfort and having no lasting psychological effect. We address 
human dignity as a psychological interest. 
Material 
interests  
Damages to one’s material support, including financial means and 
amenities. These interests range from the most basic material support 
necessary for subsistence to the material goods and amenities needed 
for enhanced well-being.  
Reputation  
Damages to others’ view of the individual. They might involve instances 
of mistreatment or exploitation, as could occur in cases of human 
trafficking, or stem from instances of physical assault, verbal 
harassment, or mere association. 
Privacy 
The loss of one’s ability to pursue one’s interest, involving violations of 
personal privacy, such as unauthorized intrusions or control of personal 
documents, as might occur in a burglary or kidnapping.  
Control of a victim’s passport in cases of human trafficking might, for 
example, result in a harm to privacy.  
Possible harms associated with criminal activities 
HARMS TO PRIVATE-SECTOR ENTITIES  
(including businesses and NGOs), specifically to their: 
Functional 
integrity  
Damages to the operational integrity of a private-sector entity, ranging 
from its collapse or total control to the occasional impairment of its 
decision-making and operations, possibly through the corruption of an 
official, employee, or other representative.  
Material 
interests  
Damages to an entity’s material, financial or intellectual property. Such 
injuries may stem from burglary, property damage, intellectual property  
(IP) theft and misuse, and other offences.  
Reputation   
Damages to others’ view of the entity. Injuries to reputation may arise 
from the involvement of an entity or any of its officials, employees, or 
other representatives in a criminal activity; their victimization; or the 
entity’s inability to enforce its rules.  
“Privacy” 
The loss of an entity’s ability to pursue its interests stemming from 
unauthorized access to and possible misuse of an entity’s premises or 
sensitive or proprietary information. Unauthorized access may result 
from various offenses, including burglary and the misuse of business 
documents and data in cases of VAT fraud.  
Possible harms associated with criminal activities 
HARMS TO GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, specifically to their: 
Functional 
integrity  
Damages to the operational integrity of any central, regional, or local 
public body, ranging from its collapse or total control to the occasional 
impairment of its decision-making and operations, possibly through the 
corruption of a government official or representative.  
Material 
interests  
Damages to a central, regional, or local public body’s material, financial, 
or intellectual property. Such injuries may stem from burglary, property 
damage, IP theft and misuse, tobacco smuggling, VAT fraud, etc.  
Reputation   
Damages to others’ view of the government. Injuries to reputation may 
arise from the involvement of a central, regional, or local public body or 
any of its officials or representatives in a criminal activity; their 
victimization; or the government’s inability to enforce its rules.  
“Privacy” 
The loss of a central, regional, or local public body’s ability to pursue its 
interests, stemming from unauthorized access to and possible misuse of 
that body’s premises or sensitive information. Unauthorized access may 
result from various offenses, including burglary and VAT fraud. In case of 
VAT fraud, official documents and other data are especially vulnerable.  
Possible harms associated with criminal activities 
HARMS TO THE ENVIRONMENT, specifically to its: 
Functional 
integrity  
Damages to the national, regional, or local environment,  
be it physical or social.  
Concerns about the physical environment include: 
• air, water, soil, noise, and light pollution, 
• inaccessibility of open spaces, and 
• obstruction or destruction of landscapes.  
Concerns about the social environment include: public nuisance,  
social fragmentation, and community disassociation. Drug dealing 
might, for example, create a persistent public nuisance. 
Possible harms associated with criminal activities 
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SEVERITY 
RATING 
Level of individual’s living standard 
at which damage occurs 
Level of entity’s  mission capability at 
which damage occurs 
Catastrophic 1˚: Subsistence, consisting of 
survival, but with maintenance of 
no more than elementary 
capacities to function 
1˚: Viability, consisting of survival,  
but with maintenance of no more than 
elementary capacities to function 
Grave 2˚: Minimal standard of living  2˚: Minimal mission capabilities  
Serious 3˚: Adequate standard of living 3˚: Adequate mission capabilities 
Moderate 4˚: Enhanced standard of living 4˚: Enhanced mission capabilities   
Marginal Marginal or no effect at any level Marginal or no effect at any level 
• Drawn from von Hirsch and Jareborg’s (1991) living-standard approach 
• Extended to other bearers by analogy, e.g., from living standard to capability to 
achieve mission for private-sector and government entities 
• Used to assess effects of intrusions upon different interests (functional integrity, 
material interest, reputation, and privacy), levels of analysis require specification 
 
 
 
Common benchmarks gauge severity 
Examples 
• Death (e.g., by homicide) is “catastrophic” 
• Petty assault might produce “marginal” harm to 
functional integrity but it might produce “moderate” 
harm to reputation  
• Drug dealing may affect the social environment 
“moderately” to “seriously” in given neighborhood but 
only “marginally” in broader perspective 
Assessment requires standardization 
Incidence provides grounding  
for prioritizing harms 
Matrix of severity, incidence, and priorities 
SEVERITY INCIDENCE 
Always Persistently Occasionally Seldom Rarely 
Catastrophic H H H H/M M/H 
Grave H H H/M M/H M 
Serious H H/M M/H M L 
Moderate H/M M/H M L L 
Marginal M/H M L L L 
Source: authors based on Greenfield and Camm, 2005. 
Notes: H = Highest priority; M = Medium priority; L = Lowest priority; we use “non 
applicable” for harms that are irrelevant in a particular context. 
Matrix offers preliminary basis for addressing 
incommensurability, using quantitative and qualitative data 
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Framework addresses challenges 
CHALLENGE APPROACH 
Cultural and socio-economic 
variability and subjectivity 
Taxonomy lists “possible harms” 
Infinitude 
Taxonomy claims to be encompassing, not exhaustive;  
accommodates harms of complex crimes that entail 
immediate, accompanying, and enabled activities 
Causality 
Taxonomy speaks of harms “associated with” criminal activity; 
assessment process includes explicit evaluation 
Quantification Scales exploit quantitative and qualitative data 
Incommensurability 
Matrix – and underlying benchmarks – enables limited 
comparisons within categories of bearers 
But in “real world,” hurdles remain 
Standardization (average individual or entity and typical criminal event), 
“denominators,” matters of degree in severity and incidence rankings 
Other distinctive features of approach 
• Applicable to most crimes, including complex 
• Attributes harms to ultimate* bearers 
– No harms to “economy,” harms to “community,” or “systemic 
harms” 
• Excludes law enforcement costs 
– Typically included in “cost of crime” analyses  
– But inclusion creates vicious cycle 
• Most-prioritized activities are, by definition, most-harmful 
• Excludes fear of crime, avoidance or mitigation costs 
– Impossible to separate by criminal activities 
– Function not of crime but of crime perceptions 
• Includes repair or replacement costs 
*As close to ultimate as data and methods permit. 
Assessment can serve various policy goals  
1. Systematically identify all types, bearers and causes of harms 
– Help design policies, including RJ,  minimizing/repairing harms for all 
bearers 
2. “Compare” harmfulness of activities within class of bearers  
– Provide evidence for strategic priority-setting in crime control 
3. Identify “most-harmful” perpetrators 
– Provide evidence for operational priority-setting in crime control 
4. “Compare” impact, including unintended consequences, of 
current and proposed policies and offences 
– Assess impact of alternative policy scenarios 
– Help identify (and change) policy interventions causing most harm  
– Establish bearers of costs (and benefits) 
5. Gauge harmfulness component of offence seriousness 
– Help establish proportionate sentences 
Outline 
• The harm assessment framework 
Application of harm framework to cannabis 
cultivation in Belgium  
̶ Project funded by Belgian Science Policy and 
carried out together with Loes Kersten and Evelien 
van Dun (University of Leuven),  Tom Decorte and 
Julie Heyde (Ghent University)  
• Conclusions 
 
 
Project motivation and aims 
• Since the 1980s domestic production of cannabis herb (i.e., 
marijuana) has risen in most consumer countries 
– Shift was particularly far-reaching in The Netherlands and has later invested 
neighbors  
• Large-scale cannabis cultivation is said to produce large 
revenues for organized crime groups and to be source of 
violence and corruption 
• Law enforcement efforts primarily aim to reduce availability 
but also to reduce organized crime profits and harms 
– Until 2011 repression of cannabis cultivation was priority of Belgium’s 
Safety Plan 
 
 
 
How does cannabis cultivation in Belgium take place?  
Which harms are associated with it  
and what are their severity, incidence and causes?  
Project methods and samples 
• Research design combines quantitative and qualitative methods 
• Ghent team was responsible for internet survey, part of GCCRC 
– 1,293 valid surveys from whole of Belgium: age 18-81, mostly males (90.9%), 
mostly small-scale (73.4% < 5 plants;  98.3% <49 plants) 
• Leuven team was responsible for qualitative data collection focusing 
on large-scale cultivators 
– 20 interviews with imprisoned cultivators:  aged 24-63, all males, 17 Belgian, 
3 Dutch 
– 28 interviews with experts, mostly but not exclusively from law enforcement 
– Analysis of 34 criminal cases opened in 2005-2011: 1-46 suspects per case, 
aged 18-69, mostly males (85.5%), Dutch and Belgian, all large-scale 
• Data have obvious limitations, which are only partially alleviated by 
triangulation 
Identify possible harms and bearers 
(taxonomy) 
Rate 
severity 
of harm 
(scale) 
Establish causality of harm 
Rate 
incidence of 
criminal activity 
and of harm in 
relation to 
criminal activity 
(scale) 
Construct business model 
Prioritize harms 
(matrix) 
Working through harm assessment process 
Evaluate severity and  
incidence of harm 
The business model of cannabis cultivation 
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The growing process and related harms 
• Most survey respondents (74.1%) cultivate on/in their own property, 
outdoor and indoor, and hence cause no harm to others 
• Interviewed large-scale cultivators grow indoor, in rented properties, 
occasionally buying owners off or using false IDs 
• Electricity theft is source of largest harm in this phase 
̶ 7% of survey respondents (18.4% of those cultivating more than 20 plants, 
n=7) and almost all interviewed cultivators admit theft 
̶ Harms assessed €4,000 to €98,000 per plantation in criminal cases 
̶ According to Eandis, 80% of recorded amount of theft is cannabis-related; 
1,040 cases in 2003-2010;  average harm is € 22,018 per case 
̶ Electricity theft also occasionally sets up fires  
• Harms sometimes result also from the destruction of property and 
water overflow 
• Survey provides no data on this, but according to police 3 to 5 plantations 
were discovered each year in 2006-11 due to water damages 
 
 
 
Harvesting and sale and related harms 
• Small-scale cultivators (< 20 plants) harvest plant themselves 
and produce no harm 
• Very large-scale cultivators sometimes recruit “cutting teams” 
• In six criminal cases Eastern Europeans were recruited, were paid 
regular salaries but also “surveilled” 
• Some interviewed cultivators report good treatment of cutters but 
others and experts suggest exploitation  
• E.g., hard work, no pay, transport in  shuttered buses 
• Only 8.1 % of survey respondents (36.1% > 20 plants) but all 
cultivators interviewed and charged in criminal cases are 
interested in monetary profits 
• Some interviewed cultivators admit considerable earnings 
– “Farmgate” price is around €3.500 per Kg 
– 250 plants deliver at least 30 Kg per harvest, thus can be sold at 
€100,000 
Theft and destruction of 
plants/harvest/equipment 
• Theft and destruction of plants/harvest/equipment may occur 
to all cultivators but especially to those cultivating more than 
20 plants 
– 13.7% of survey respondents (17.7% > 20 plants ) admit having been 
involved in theft of plants, 5.6% (18.2% > 20 plants) in theft of harvest, 
1.8% in theft of equipment (9.4% > 20 plants) and 12.3% in destruction 
of plants (30.3% > 20 plants)   
– 4 interviewed cultivators and 4 criminal cases also report theft of 
cannabis 
• These activities often lead to violence but in our framework, 
they produce per se no harm, as they involve illegal property 
• Experts speak of booby traps to discourage theft but other 
sources provide no supporting evidence 
 
 
Use or threat of violence and related harms 
• Only 6.8% of survey respondents have direct experience of verbal 
conflicts, only 1.5% of actual violence 
– Those cultivating more than 20 plants are more frequently involved: 12.9% 
in verbal conflicts, 6.5% in physical conflicts 
– Some physical conflicts reported have had serious consequences 
– Eight injuries, one permanent injury, one death 
– Counterparts are relatives, friends but also customers/suppliers or thieves 
• Other sources also report little violence  
– Only three out of 20 interviewed cultivators have direct experience of 
physical violence 
• Consequences can be serious,: in one case a paralysis 
• Counterparts are mostly unknown thieves 
– Two out of 34 criminal cases report a kidnapping and two shoot-outs, seven 
others threats 
– Experts report no violence 
• Violence is probably underreported in criminal justice sources 
 
Corruption and related harms  
• According to all sources there is very limited, low-level 
governmental corruption 
– 9 survey respondents report receiving help of police officers, 8 of other 
officials 
– Two interviewed cultivators report contacts with law enforcement officers 
– Criminal cases mention small (suspected) favors 
– It is unclear if anyone was really bribed 
• Private-sector representatives are more frequently involved 
as facilitators 
– 15.6% (n=99) of survey respondents report receiving help from (Dutch) 
grow- and coffee-shops, 10% (n=63) from electricians or lawyers 
• Those cultivating more than 20 plants report more frequently help from electricians and 
lawyers (25.8%) 
– Interviewed cultivators and criminal cases also report favors from real 
estate agents and involvement of car rentals and other logistics enterprises 
– Some of these facilitators work independently, some harm their companies 
 
 
Money laundering and related harms 
• Earnings are primarily used to buy luxury goods and 
support lush lifestyle  
– Also reinvested in cannabis cultivation or other illegal activities 
• Earnings suggest that crime pays, thus tainting 
government’s reputation 
• Private-sector facilitators are sometimes used to launder 
money 
̶ Survey respondents admitted receiving help or advice from lawyers (40), 
notaries (10), bank officials (11), accountants (6), insurance companies 
officials (4) and tax advisors (4)  
̶ A few criminal cases provide evidence of “sophisticated” laundering 
techniques 
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Possible harms touch upon many interests 
  Growing Harvesting 
& sale 
Corruption Violenc
e 
Money 
laundering 
Bearers 
HARMS TO INDIVIDUALS, specifically to their: 
Functional integrity           
Loss of life n/a n/a n/a X n/a 
- Cultivators, their relatives, friends, 
suppliers/customers and thieves, if 
targeted by use of violence 
Other: physical 
& psychological 
n/a n/a n/a X n/a - All persons targeted by use of violence 
Only 
psychological 
n/a X n/a X n/a 
- All persons targeted by threats 
- Member of cutting teams, if intimidated 
Material 
interest 
X n/a n/a X n/a 
- Ancillary to functional harms, for those 
targeted by use or threat of violence 
- Owners of property, if this is damaged 
Reputation n/a X n/a X n/a 
- All persons targeted by use or threat of 
violence 
- Owners of property, if this is misused 
w/o their knowledge 
Privacy X X n/a X n/a 
- Same two categories as for reputation 
- Member of cutting teams, if controlled 
  Growing 
Harvesting 
& sale 
Corruption Violence 
Money 
laundering 
Bearers 
HARMS TO PRIVATE-SECTOR ENTITIES, specifically to their: 
Functional 
Integrity 
n/a  n/a X n/a X 
- Specialized shops, electrical companies, farms and 
law and logistics firms, if corrupt employees 
misuse assets w/o their knowledge 
Material interest X n/a X n/a n/a 
- Ancillary to functional harms (property) 
- Electrical companies, if electricity is stolen 
- Owners of property, if this is damaged 
Reputation  X n/a X n/a X 
- Specialized shops, electrical companies, farms and 
law and logistics firms, if corrupt employees 
misuse assets w/o their knowledge 
- Owners of property, if this is damaged 
“Privacy” X n/a X n/a n/a - Same two categories as for reputation 
HARMS TO GOVERNMENT, specifically to its: 
Functional 
integrity 
n/a n/a X n/a n/a 
- Government agencies, if representatives engage 
in corrupt practices, incl. neglect of duties 
Material interest n/a n/a X X n/a 
- Ancillary to functional harms (health) 
- Wages associated with neglect of duties 
Reputation  
n/a n/a X n/a n/a 
- Government agencies, if representatives engage 
in corrupt practices, incl. neglect of duties 
X X X X X - Gov’ment writ large, if it cannot enforce its laws 
“Privacy” n/a n/a X n/a n/a 
- Government agencies, i.e., if officials/ 
representatives engage in corrupt practices 
HARMS TO ENVIRONMENT, specifically to its: 
Funct. Integrity X n/a n/a n/a n/a - Neighbors, if affected by bad smell and noise  
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Cannabis production occurs always 
• Sharp increase in number of plant seizures and detected 
“plantations” (> 2 plants) in Belgium since 2000 
– From 73,334 plants and 35 plantations in 2003 to 337,955 plants and  
1,069 plantations in 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• At any moment cannabis is being cultivated in Belgium 
– Belgian production feeds Belgian market and Dutch coffeeshops 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Micro scale: 2-5 plants  66 136 134 209 190 
Mini scale: 6-49 plants 130 219 226 313 376 
Small scale: 50-249 plants 62 125 166 163 187 
Middle scale: 250-499 plants  40 58 72 93 101 
Large scale: 500-999 plants 44 63 65 106 119 
Industrial scale: >1000 
plants 
51 45 66 86 88 
Seedling farms 5 2 8 9 8 
Total  398 648 737 979 1069 
Plantations detected by the Belgian Federal Police, by scale, 2007-2011 
Source: 
Belgian 
Federal Police, 
2012. 
Actual harms accrue to individuals*  
  Severity Incidence** Priority Activity 
HARMS TO INDIVIDUALS, specifically to their: 
Functional integrity       
Loss of life Catastrophic Rarely M/Hi ̶ Violence  
Other physical 
and 
psychological 
Grave Rarely Mi 
̶ Violence (i.e., assault causing 
permanent damages) 
Serious Rarely Li ̶ Violence (i.e., assault and kidnapping) 
Moderate Rarely Li ̶ " 
Marginal Rarely  Li ̶ Violence (i.e., petty assault) 
Only 
psychological 
Marginal Seldom  Li ̶ Violence threatened (i.e., intimidation) 
Marginal  Rarely Li 
̶ Growing, if other persons’ ID is used for 
rent of property 
̶ Harvesting, if cutting teams are 
intimidated 
*Estimates exclude harms associated with cannabis distribution and use. 
**Overall incidence, accounting for incidence of activities and of harms in relation to 
activities. 
Material interest 
 
Serious 
Seldom to 
rarely 
M/Li 
̶ Growing, if rented properties are seriously 
damaged (e.g., fire) 
Moderate Occasionally Mi 
̶ Growing, if rented properties are 
extensively damaged (e.g., waterflow) 
Marginal Persistently  Mi 
̶ Growing, if rented properties are lightly 
damaged (e.g., holes in walls) 
Reputation 
Moderate Rarely Li 
̶ Violence (i.e., all forms of assault) 
̶ Growing, if other persons’ ID is used for 
rent of property 
Marginal Seldom  Li 
̶ Violence threatened (i.e., intimidation) 
̶ Growing, if rented properties are misused 
w/o the owner’s knowledge 
Privacy 
Moderate Rarely Li 
̶ Violence (i.e., assault and kidnapping) 
̶ Growing, if other persons’ ID is used for 
rent of property 
Marginal Seldom Li 
̶ Growing, if rented properties are misused 
w/o the owner’s knowledge 
Actual harms accrue to individuals*  
*Estimates exclude harms associated with cannabis distribution and use. 
**Overall incidence, accounting for incidence of activities and of harms in relation to 
activities. 
  Severity Incidence** Priority Activity 
HARMS TO INDIVIDUALS, specifically to their: 
Actual harms also accrue to others* 
  Severity Incidence** Priority Activity 
HARMS TO PRIVATE-SECTOR ENTITIES, specifically to their: 
Functional 
integrity 
Marginal Seldom Lps Corruption 
Marginal Rarely Lps Money laundering 
Material interest 
Serious 
Seldom to 
rarely 
M/Lps 
Growing, if rented properties are seriously 
damaged (e.g. fire) 
Moderate Occasionally Mps 
Growing, if rented properties are 
extensively damaged (e.g. waterflow) 
Marginal Persistently Mps 
Growing, if rented properties are lightly 
damaged (e.g. holes in walls) 
Marginal Occasionally Lps Theft of electricity 
Marginal Rarely Lps 
Corruption 
Money laundering 
Reputation  
Marginal Seldom Lps 
Corruption 
Growing, if rented properties are misused 
w/o the owner’s knowledge 
Marginal Rarely Lps Money laundering 
“Privacy” 
Marginal Seldom Lps 
Corruption 
Growing, if rented properties are misused 
w/o the owner’s knowledge 
Marginal Rarely Lps Money laundering 
*Estimates exclude harms associated with cannabis distribution and use. 
**Overall incidence, accounting for incidence of activities and of harms in relation to activities. 
Actual harms also accrue to others* 
  Severity 
Incidence*
* 
Priority Activity 
HARMS TO GOVERNMENT, specifically to its: 
Functional 
integrity 
Marginal Rarely Lg Corruption  
Material 
interest 
Moderate Rarely  Lg 
Violence (i.e., assault causing 
permanent damages) 
Marginal Persistently Mg 
Growing, costs of dismantling 
plantations 
Marginal Rarely Lg 
Violence (i.e., medical treatment of 
petty assaults) 
Corruption  
Reputation 
Marginal Always Mg 
All criminal activities (non-enforcement 
effect) 
Marginal Rarely Lg Corruption 
HARMS TO ENVIRONMENT, specifically to its: 
Functional 
integrity 
Marginal Rarely Le Growing (bad smells and noise) 
*Estimates exclude harms associated with cannabis distribution and use. 
**Overall incidence, accounting for incidence of activities and of harms in relation to activities. 
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Policy plays substantial role in non-use-
related harms, other harms TBD 
• Most non-use-related harms arise from illegal status 
and specific enforcement practices 
– Harms associated with growing and harvesting 
– Harms associated with violence, corruption and money 
laundering 
• Use-related harms to-be-determined 
– Some harms arise from properties of drug, but policy, 
modes of enforcement, etc. also play part 
 
 
Outline 
• The harm assessment framework 
• Application of harm framework to cannabis 
cultivation in Belgium  
Conclusions 
 
 
What have we learned? 
Substantive lessons 
• Cannabis production causes various harms to all bearers: 
– Most are low priority but several are medium   
– Growing and violence cause most serious harms  
• Illegal status of cannabis and enforcement practices are cause of 
most non-use-related-harms 
– These harms can be offset by use-related harms prevented by prohibition 
• Analysis needs to be completed but non-use-related harms seem 
to be not uniformly distributed across different types of 
cultivators 
– Large-scale cultivators seem to be largely responsible for them 
– Small-scale cultivators (< 20 plants) cause limited harms  
 
Comparison  
with cocaine and human trafficking 
• Cannabis cultivation generates higher-priority harms to 
Belgium than cocaine or human trafficking  
– Unlike cocaine, it causes serious to marginal harm to material 
interest of individuals and businesses 
– Human trafficking generates more serious harms to individuals but 
occurs rarely and therefore most of its harm score low priority 
• Most and most serious human trafficking harms are intrinsic, 
non-use-related harms of cocaine and cannabis are due to 
policies 
– Use-related harms TBD 
• In human trafficking, harms to individuals concerns victims, 
in cocaine trafficking, perpetrators, in cannabis cultivation 
both 
 
 
What have we learned? 
Methodological lessons 
• Framework enables comparisons of distribution of harms 
and rankings within categories, but some hurdles remain 
• Framework does not enable comparisons across categories 
– Priority rankings offer preliminary basis for addressing 
incommensurability of harms 
• Decisions about prioritization are normative due to 
incommensurability of harms and differences in bearers’ 
roles in criminal activities  
• Conceptual and technical challenges remain daunting  
– Our framework addresses some of them and spells limitations 
 
“Why must we reject being vaguely right  
in favor of being precisely wrong?” (Sen 1987) 
Harm: necessary benchmark  
for crime control policy 
• “Task of assessing the seriousness of the offence is … 
as complex and problematic as it is unavoidable and 
fundamental” (Ashworth 2006) 
• “Taking harm reduction seriously requires a common 
metric of harm across all crimes” (Sherman, 2007) 
• Ultimate decisions  are inherently normative but 
would be stronger if informed by empirical assessment 
 
Assessment can serve various policy goals  
1. Systematically identify all types, bearers and causes of harms 
– Help design policies, including RJ,  minimizing harms for all bearers 
2. “Compare” harmfulness of activities within class of bearers  
– Provide evidence for strategic priority-setting in crime control 
3. Identify “most-harmful” perpetrators 
– Provide evidence for operational priority-setting in crime control 
4. “Compare” impact, including unintended consequences, of 
current and proposed policies and offences 
– Assess impact of alternative policy scenarios 
– Help identify (and change) policy interventions causing most harm  
– Establish bearers of costs (and benefits) 
5. Gauge harmfulness component of offence seriousness 
– Help establish proportionate sentences 
Concrete examples of police-relevant  
policy goals served by framework 
1. Systematically identify all types, bearers and causes of harms 
– Help design policies, including RJ,  minimizing/repairing harms for all bearers 
• E.g., in the case of cocaine trafficking, swallowing of cocaine balls produces most 
serious harms to individuals 
2. “Compare” harmfulness of activities within class of bearers  
– Provide evidence for strategic priority-setting in crime control 
• E.g., cannabis production produces more harms to Belgium than cocaine 
trafficking 
3. Identify “most-harmful” perpetrators 
– Provide evidence for operational priority-setting in crime control 
• E.g., most harms associated with cannabis production  seem to be associated 
with  cultivators with more than 20 plants 
4. “Compare” impact, including unintended consequences, of current and 
proposed policies and offences 
– Help identify (and change) policy interventions causing most harm  
– Establish bearers of costs (and benefits) 
• E.g., expansion of large-scale cannabis cultivation in Belgium can be seen as 
unintended consequence of Dutch cannabis policy  
• Key question: Which policy  can best minimize total or specific set of harms? 
Background slides:  
Application of harm framework to 
cocaine trafficking 
Project funded by Belgian Science Policy and carried out 
together with Andries Zoutendijk (University of Leuven/ Dutch 
Police Academy) and Victoria A. Greenfield (RAND) 
 
Research design 
• Draw on multiple data sources, largely, but not 
exclusively from criminal justice system 
– 52 criminal proceedings from 2003 to 2007  
– 81 data files (42 “new”) recorded in organized crime database of 
Belgian Federal Police from 2006 to 2008 
– Organized crime reports and statistics 
– Interviews with 15 (+) law enforcement experts on cocaine trafficking, 
dealing, and money laundering 
– Interviews with 12 imprisoned traffickers/dealers 
– Scientific literature and media (some not Belgian) 
• Triangualate data to validate findings 
– Admit other experts’ judgment but not our own, not codifying our 
prior opinions as fact, but possibly understating some harms 
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Traffickers exploit air, sea, and land to move 
drugs with modicum of violence and corruption 
• Main phases of cocaine trafficking in Belgium 
– Import (air, sea, and land) 
• Antwerp port and Brussels airport dominate 
• Trafficking over land occurs primarily from The Netherlands 
– Wholesale distribution or export 
• Accompanying activities 
– Use or threat of violence 
– Corruption (e.g., cooperation of baggage handlers) 
– Money laundering 
• Enabled activities, i.e., retail dealing and drug use 
Export
Import
Wholesale 
distribution
Dealing Use
Belgium
(inside “egg”)
Money laundering, 
threat or use of violence, 
corruption Dealing
(retail)
Trafficking
(wholesale)
R.O.W. 
(outside “egg”)
Sea,
air,
land
The business model of cocaine 
trafficking in Belgium 
Antwerp port and Brussels airport 
dominate flows 
• Antwerp port and Brussels airport account for 75-80% of number 
of wholesale (>0.5 kg) cocaine seizures and up to 90% of amount 
• Reflecting different smuggling techniques, Antwerp port accounts 
for much larger share of amount seized (about half or more) 
NUMBER OF SEIZURES AMOUNT SEIZED 
Year Total Antwerp 
port 
Brussels 
airport 
Total Antwerp 
port 
Brussels 
airport 
n. n. % n. % tons tons % tons % 
2005 n/a 6 n/a 57 n/a 9.2 2.9*  31.5 1.7*  18.5 
2006 174 22 12.6 108 62.1 3.9 2.1 53.8 0.7 17.9 
2007 188 14 7.4 133 70.7 2.5 1.2 48.0 0.7 28.0 
2008 168 38 22.6 94 56.0 3.9 2.5 64.1 0.9  23.1 
Source: Belgian Federal Police (2010).       
*Data exclude customs seizures, which include some large seizures at Antwerp port. 
Sea route: Antwerp port 
• Port of Antwerp, second  
largest in Europe 
• Cocaine arrives on ships,  
most frequently in containers 
– Shipping amounts range from few kilograms 
to several tons 
– U.S. State Department (2006) estimates 20 
tons of cocaine enter port yearly 
• Port workers occasionally assist in 
retrieving cocaine 
• In most cases, transport or 
manufacturing businesses are not aware 
of their involvement 
• Little evidence of violence 
 
Air route: Brussels airport  
• Cocaine arrives from Africa and Latin America 
• Commonly  swallowed or hidden in luggage 
– Two body packers have died since 2000  
– Smuggling in luggage occasionally involves cooperation of 
baggage handlers (2 major cases since 2007) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Cocaine couriers 
arrested 
164 116 87 39 
Main airports of 
departure 
(≥8 arrests) 
Conakry, Abidjan, 
Caracas, 
Cancun, Dakar, 
Banjul 
Conakry, Dakar, 
Banjul, Lome 
Conakry, 
Punta Cana 
Punta Cana 
Body packers* 85 47 37 17 
Source: Belgian Federal Police, 2010.  
*Most, not all, of the arrested body packers carried cocaine 
Cocaine entering Belgium  
exceeds consumption 
• 1.75 tons consumed annually according to sewage 
water analysis (Bervoets et al., 2009); back-of-the-
envelop (UNODC data) suggests 2.5 tons 
• Large-scale (>0.5 kg) seizures, alone, ranged from 2.5 
tons in 2007 to 9.2 tons in 2005* 
• U.S. State Department reports (2006, 2010) suggest 20+ 
tons of cocaine enter and/or transit Belgium each year 
*Source: Belgian Federal Police, 2010. Not purity adjusted. See earlier slide for data. 
 
  
Transhipment accounts for large share of flows 
(even with purity adjustments) 
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Possible harms touch most interests 
Example: Import phase, including violence and corruption 
HARM SEA AIR LAND 
Functional integrity of body packers, e.g., fatal or non-fatal injuries* X 
Functional integrity of traffickers, couriers, facilitators, and government 
officials/representatives targeted by use or threat of violence* 
X X X 
Functional integrity of transport and/or import-sector businesses,  
e.g., corrupt officials/employees or traffickers misuse assets* 
X X X 
Functional integrity of government entities,  
e.g., corrupt officials/employees abrogating duties 
X X X 
Material interests of transport companies, e.g., rental car damage X X 
Reputation of individuals, e.g., from battery or petty assault X X 
Reputation of transport and/or import-sector businesses,  
e.g., corrupt officials/employees or traffickers misuse assets**; damage can 
occur even if firm initially lacks knowledge of traffickers’ misuse 
X X X 
Reputation of government entities, e.g., officials/representatives engage in 
corrupt practices or they/others misuse assets**; damage can also occur if 
government entities appear unable to enforce laws 
X X X 
*May entail ancillary material damage. 
**If corruption or misuse becomes publicly known. 
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Cocaine trafficking is persistent 
• U.S. State Department reports (2006, 2010) suggest 20+ 
tons of cocaine enter and/or transit Belgium each year 
– 20 tons of cocaine flow through Antwerp port alone 
– 25% of cocaine moving from South America through Europe 
eventually transits Belgium, with UN data on European flows, this 
estimate would imply at least 30 tons of cocaine annually 
• Given variability of shipment quantities—grams to tons—
and frequency of seizures, trafficking  is at least “persistent” 
– Small-scale operations occur weekly if not daily 
– Large-scale operations occur monthly if not weekly 
Actual harms accrue to individuals* 
Severity Incidence** Priority Activity 
HARMS TO INDIVIDUALS, specifically to their: 
Functional integrity 
Loss of life Catastrophic Rarely M/HI - Trafficking (i.e., lethal injuries to body packers)  
Other  
physical and 
psychological 
Grave Rarely MI 
- Trafficking (i.e., non-lethal injuries to body packers) 
- Violence in trafficking & dealing (e.g., assault) 
Serious Rarely LI " 
Moderate Rarely LI " 
Marginal Rarely LI 
- Trafficking (i.e., non-lethal injuries to body packers) 
- Violence during import (e.g., petty assault) 
Marginal 
Seldom to 
occasionally 
LI 
- Violence in all phases of trafficking , except import, 
and dealing (e.g., petty assault) 
Only psychological Marginal Occasionally LI 
- Trafficking (i.e., non-lethal injuries to body packers) 
- Violence in trafficking & dealing (e.g., intimidation) 
Reputation 
Moderate Rarely LI - Violence in trafficking & dealing (e.g., assault) 
Marginal Rarely LI - Violence in trafficking & dealing (e.g., petty assault) 
*Estimates exclude harms associated with drug use. 
**Overall incidence, accounting for incidence of activities and of harms in relation to activities. 
Actual harms also accrue to others* 
Severity Incidence** Priority Activity 
HARMS TO PRIVATE-SECTOR ENTITIES, specifically to their: 
Functional integrity Marginal  Occasionally LPS - Corruption in trafficking 
Reputation  Marginal Occasionally LPS - Corruption in trafficking 
HARMS TO GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, specifically to their: 
Functional integrity Marginal Rarely LG - Corruption in trafficking 
Material interest 
Moderate Rarely LG 
-  Trafficking  and violence (i.e., medical treatment of  
 fatal and non-fatal overdoses and serious assaults) 
Marginal 
Rarely to 
seldom 
LG 
- Violence ((i.e., medical treatment of less than serious 
   assault)  
Reputation 
Marginal Rarely  LG - Corruption in trafficking 
Marginal Persistently MG - All criminal activities (i.e., non-enforcement effect) 
HARMS TO THE ENVIRONMENT, specifically to its: 
Functional integrity 
(social environment) 
Marginal Occasionally LE - Dealing 
*Estimates exclude harms associated with drug use.  
**Overall incidence, accounting for incidence of activities and of harms in relation to activities. 
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Policy plays substantial role in non-
use-related harms, other harms TBD 
• Only dealing-related harms are remote 
• Most non-use-related harms arise from illegal status 
and specific enforcement practices 
– Harms associated with trafficking 
– Harms associated with violence and corruption 
– Harms associated with dealing 
• Use-related harms to-be-determined 
– Some harms arise from properties of drug, but policy, 
modes of enforcement, etc. also play part 
 
 
